Monday, September 1, 2014

The Soviet Union shoots a Korean Air Lines Boeing 747-2B5B in September 1983

Korean Air Lines Flight 007

A Korean Air Lines Boeing 747-2B5B in September 1983, similar to the one shot down by a Soviet Su-15 interceptor.
Shootdown summary
Date1 September 1983
SummaryAirliner shootdown
SiteNear Moneron Island, west ofSakhalin IslandSoviet Union
46°34′N 141°17′E
Coordinates46°34′N 141°17′E
Passengers246[1]
Crew23[note 1]
Injuries (non-fatal)0
Fatalities269
Survivors0
Aircraft typeBoeing 747-230B
OperatorKorean Air Lines
RegistrationHL7442
 (previously D-ABYH)
Flight originJohn F. Kennedy International Airport,
New York City, United States
StopoverAnchorage International Airport,
Anchorage, Alaska, U.S.
DestinationGimpo International Airport,
Gangseo-guSeoulSouth Korea

The aircraft flying as Korean Air Lines Flight 007 was a commercial Boeing 747-230B delivered on January 28, 1972, with the serial number CN20559/186 and registration HL7442 (formerly D-ABYH[10] operated by Condor). The aircraft departed Gate 15 of John F. Kennedy International Airport, New York City on August 30, 1983, bound for Gimpo Airport inGangseo-guSeoul, 35 minutes behind its scheduled departure time of 23:50 EDT (03:50 UTC, August 31). The flight was carrying 246 passengers and 23 crew members.[note 1][11] After refueling at Anchorage International Airport in Anchorage, Alaska, the aircraft, piloted on this leg of the journey by Captain Chun Byung-in,[12] departed for Seoul at 04:00 Alaska Time(13:00 UTC) on August 31, 1983.
The aircrew had an unusually high ratio of crew to passengers, as six deadheading crew were on board.[13] Twelve passengers occupied the upper deck first class, while in business almost all of 24 seats were taken; in economy class, approximately 80 seats did not contain passengers. There were 22 children under the age of 12 years aboard. One hundred and thirty passengers planned to connect to other destinations such as Tokyo, Hong Kong, and Taipei.[14]
U.S. congressman Lawrence McDonald from Georgia, who at the time was also the second president of the conservative John Birch Society, was on the flight. Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina, Senator Steven Symms of Idaho, and Representative Carroll J. Hubbard, Jr. of Kentucky were aboard sister flight KAL 015, which flew 15 minutes behind KAL 007; they were headed, along with McDonald on KAL 007, to Seoul, South Korea, in order to attend the ceremonies for the thirtieth anniversary of the U.S.-South Korea Mutual Defense Treaty.[citation needed] The Soviets contended former U.S. president Richard Nixon was to have been seated next to Larry McDonald on KAL 007 but that the CIA warned him not to go, according to the New York Post and TASS; this was denied by Nixon. [15]

Flight deviation from assigned route[edit]

After taking off from Anchorage, the flight was instructed by Air Traffic Control (ATC) to turn to a heading of 220 degrees. Approximately 90 seconds later, ATC directed the flight to "proceed direct Bethel when able".[16][17] Upon arriving over Bethel, Alaska, flight 007 entered the northernmost of five 50-mile (80 km) wide airways, known as the NOPAC (North Pacific) routes, that bridge the Alaskan and Japanese coasts. KAL 007's particular airway, R-20 (Romeo 20), passes just 17.5 miles (28.2 km) from what was then Soviet airspace off the Kamchatka coast.
The autopilot system used at the time had four basic control modes: HEADING, VOR/LOCILS, and INS. The HEADING mode maintained a constant magnetic course selected by the pilot. The VOR/LOC mode maintained the plane on a specific course, transmitted from a ground VOR (VHF omnidirectional range) or Localizer beacon selected by the pilot. The ILS (instrument landing system) mode caused the plane to track both vertical and lateral course beacons, which led to a specific runway selected by the pilot. The INS (inertial navigation system) mode maintained the plane on lateral course lines between selected flight plan waypoints programmed into the INS computer.
When the INS navigation systems were properly programmed with the filed flight plan waypoints, the pilot could turn the autopilot mode selector switch to the INS position and the plane would then automatically track the programmed INS course line, provided the plane was headed in the proper direction and within 7.5 nautical miles (13.9 km) of that course line. If, however, the plane was more than 7.5 miles (12.1 km) from the flight-planned course line when the pilot turned the autopilot mode selector from HEADING to INS, the plane would continue to track the heading selected in HEADING mode as long as the actual position of the plane was more than 7.5 miles (12.1 km) from the programmed INS course line. The autopilot computer software commanded the INS mode to remain in the "armed" condition until the plane had moved to a position less than 7.5 miles (12.1 km) from the desired course line. Once that happened, the INS mode would change from "armed" to "capture" and the plane would track the flight-planned course from then on.[18]
The HEADING mode of the autopilot would normally be engaged sometime after takeoff to comply with vectors from ATC, and then after receiving appropriate ATC clearance, to guide the plane to intercept the desired INS course line.[18]
The Anchorage VOR beacon was not operational because of maintenance.[19] The crew received a NOTAM (Notice to Airmen) of this fact, which was not seen as a problem, as the captain could still check his position at the next VORTAC beacon at Bethel, 346 miles (557 km) away. The aircraft was required to maintain the assigned heading of 220 degrees, until it could receive the signals from Bethel, then it could fly direct to Bethel, as instructed by ATC, by centering the VOR "to" course deviation indicator (CDI) and then engaging the auto pilot in the VOR/LOC mode. Then, when over the Bethel beacon, the flight could start using INS mode to follow the waypoints that make up route Romeo-20 around the coast of the USSR to Seoul. The INS mode was necessary for this route, since after Bethel the plane would be mostly out of range from VOR stations.

A simplified CIA map showing divergence of planned and actual flight paths.

At about 10 minutes after take-off, KAL 007, flying on a heading of 245 degrees, began to deviate to the right (north) of its assigned route to Bethel, and continued to fly on this constant heading for the next five and a half hours.[20]
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) simulationand analysis of the flight data recorder determined that this deviation was probably caused by the aircraft's autopilot system operating in HEADING mode, after the point that it should have been switched to the INS mode.[8][21]According to the ICAO, the autopilot was not operating in the INS mode either because the crew did not switch the autopilot to the INS mode (shortly after Cairn Mountain), or they did select the INS mode, but the computer did not transition from INERTIAL NAVIGATION ARMED to INS mode because the aircraft had already deviated off track by more than the 7.5 nautical miles (13.9 km) tolerance permitted by the inertial navigation computer. Whatever the reason, the autopilot remained in the HEADING mode, and the problem was not detected by the crew.[8]
At 28 minutes after takeoff, civilian radar at Kenai, on the eastern shore of Cook Inlet and with radar coverage 175 miles (282 km) west of Anchorage, tracked KAL 007 5.6 miles (9.0 km) north of where it should have been.[22]
When KAL 007 did not reach Bethel at 50 minutes after takeoff, a military radar at King Salmon, Alaska, tracked KAL 007 at 12.6 nautical miles (23.3 km) north of where it should have been. There is no evidence to indicate that civil air traffic controllers or military radar personnel at Elmendorf Air Force Base (who were in a position to receive the King Salmon radar output) were aware of KAL 007's deviation in real-time, and therefore able to warn the aircraft. It had exceeded its expected maximum deviation sixfold, 2 nautical miles (3.7 km) of error being the maximum expected drift from course if the inertial navigation system was activated.[22]
KAL 007's divergence prevented the aircraft from transmitting its position via shorter range very high frequency radio (VHF). It therefore requested KAL 015, also en route to Seoul, to relay reports to air traffic control on its behalf.[23]KAL 007 requested KAL 015 to relay its position three times in total. At 14:43 UTC, KAL 007 directly transmitted a change of estimated time of arrival for its next waypoint, NEEVA, to the international flight service station at Anchorage,[24] but it did so over the longer range high frequency radio (HF) rather than VHF. HF transmissions are able to carry a longer distance than VHF, but are vulnerable to interference and static; VHF is clearer with less interference, and preferred by flight crews. The inability to establish direct radio communications to be able to transmit their position directly did not alert the pilots of KAL 007 of their ever-increasing divergence[22] and was not considered unusual by air traffic controllers.[23] Halfway between Bethel and waypoint NABIE, KAL 007 passed through the southern portion of the North American Air Defense buffer zone. This zone is north of Romeo 20 and off-limits to civilian aircraft.
Some time after leaving American territorial waters, KAL Flight 007 crossed the International Date Line, where the local date shifted from August 31, 1983 to September 1, 1983.
KAL 007 continued its journey, ever increasing its deviation—60 nautical miles (110 km) off course at waypoint NABIE, 100 nautical miles (190 km) off course at waypoint NUKKS, and 160 nautical miles (300 km) off course at waypoint NEEVA—until it reached the Kamchatka Peninsula.[9]


NationalityVictims
 Australia2
 British Hong Kong12
 Canada8
 Dominican Republic1
 India1
 Iran1
 Japan28
 Malaysia1
 Philippines16
 South Korea105 *
 Sweden1
 Taiwan23
 Thailand5
 United Kingdom2
 United States62
 Vietnam1
Total269
* 76 passengers, 23 active crew and 6 deadheading crew.[

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